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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals both refused to 
address the central and dispositive issue in this case. Instead, 
both Courts focused on and decided an issue of first impression 
which did not have to be addressed and which invalidated a 
twenty-five year old Administrative Policy of the Utah State 
Engineer. 
The questions presented for review are: 
1. Is it appropriate for the Court of Appeals to decide a 
question of first impression and thus overturn a long standing and 
generally accepted Administrative Policy of the Utah State Engineer 
when the answer to that question is unnecessary to the determination 
of the case? Does not justice require that courts of law address 
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and resolve the central and dispositive issues of the case before 
seeking out and resolving questions of first impression that have no 
real bearing on the outcome? 
The specific issues Appellant has pressed in both the Trial 
Court and before the Court of Appeals are: 
1. Under §73-1-11 U.C.A. 1953, does not water pass as an 
appurtenance to land, unless reserved, after the State Engineer's 
certificate of appropriation issues and it is stipulated that said 
water was actually placed to use on the land so conveyed? (This is 
the question the Court of Appeals sidestepped and failed to address. 
But, the answer to this question renders unnecessary the answer to 
the question the Court of Appeals did address and did decide. This 
is so because Appellant received deeds conveying the land and all 
appurtenances before, and, after the State Engineer issued the 
certificate of appropriation.) 
2. Consistent with the policy of the Utah State Engineer to 
transfer water as an appurtenance to the land under §73-1-11 U.C.A. 
before a certificate of appropriation issues. Appellant also claims 
to have received land and appurtenant water before the State 
Engineer's certificate of appropriation issued. (This is the issue 
the Court of Appeals unnecessarily decided.) 
OPINION BELOW 
Little v. Greene & Weed Investments, 141 Utah Adv. Rpts. 20 
(C.A. 8/15/90) (see Addendum "A" for the text of the decision). 
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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This is a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Trial Court in a Decision 
entered August 15f 1990. A Petition for Rehearing was filed August 
28, 1990. The Petition was denied September 5r 1990. (See Addendum 
nBn.) This Court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1989) and §78-2a-4 (1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Section 73-1-11 U.C.A. 1953. 
Appurtenant Waters - Use as Passing Under Conveyance. A 
right to the use of water appurtenant to land shall pass 
to the grantee of such land, andf in cases where such 
right has been exercised in irrigating different parcels 
of land at different times, such rights shall pass to the 
grantee of any parcel of land on which such right was 
exercised next preceding the time of the execution of any 
conveyance thereof; subject, however, in all cases to 
payment by the grantee in any such conveyance of all 
amounts unpaid on any assessment then due under any such 
right; provided, that any such right to the use of water, 
or any part thereof, may be reserved by the grantor in any 
such conveyance by making such reservation in express 
terms in such conveyancer or it may be separately 
conveyed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS 
This action was brought in two Counts; Count I being an appeal 
of a decision of the Utah State Engineer, and Count II being an 
action to quiet title to a water right. Because ownership of the 
water right was considered determinative to the outcome of the State 
Engineer appeal, the trial was bifurcated, with the quiet title 
action being tried first. The current proceedings involve only the 
quiet title portion of these bifurcated proceedings. 
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Both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals decided the case 
on the proposition that a water right cannot pass as an appurtenance 
to the transfer of land until a certificate of appropriation issues 
from the Utah State Engineer. (See attached Addendum "A", pp. 4 and 
5.) Not only is this holding contrary to a clearly established 
policy of the Utah State Engineer, but it completely fails to 
address the second part of the Appellant's two-part argument. That 
is, even if water did not pass to Appellant as an appurtenance to 
the transfer of land before the State Engineer issued the 
certificate of appropriationf Appellant nevertheless obtained a deed 
immediately after the certificate so issued which included 30.1 
acres of the subject land and all appurtenances* This second 
transfer made it unnecessary for either the Trial Court or the Court 
of Appeals to address the only question they did address and which 
invalidated a twenty-five year old Administrative Policy of the 
State Engineer to transfer title to water rights as an appurtenance 
to land before a certificate issues. Both the Trial Court and the 
Court of Appeals refused to address this part of Appellant's case, 
although it was clearly and specifically raised in both proceedings 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 28-30; Reply Brief, pp. 18-20f 116). 
Moreoverf this question it is the sole focus of Appellant's Petition 
for Rehearing. 
The facts are undisputed. They are: 
1. On December 19, 1967, Lester F. Little, Appellant's father, 
was the owner of a water right for use on a specifically described 
83.3 acres of land (Finding of Fact 9, Pre-Trial Order 111(b)). 
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2. On December 19
 f 1967f Lester F. Little submitted proof of 
appropriation on said water right (FF lf PI. Ex. 41). "Proof" is 
a sworn statement by the appropriator of water and his or her proof 
engineer that the appropriation is completer the diversion 
facilities have been constructed (wells, pipelines, etc.) and the 
water has actually been placed to use. It includes, mapsf profiles 
and drawings prepared by the engineer locating the completed water 
works, place of use, etc. (§73-3-16 U.C.A. 1953). It is the last 
statutory step required of an appropriator to complete the 
appropriation. Thereafter, the State Engineer simply issues a 
certificate of appropriation if it is made to appear that the 
appropriation has been completed in accordance with the application. 
In this particular case the State Engineer, because of other 
pressing problems, (Tr. 50, 51) did not actually issue the 
certificate until October 21, 1969, approximately two years later. 
And, because of a descriptive error, the certificate was amended 
November 25, 1969 (PTO 111(d), FF 14). 
3. The deed constituting the root title in the file maintained 
for the subject water right in the State Engineer's files is a deed 
dated January 16, 1968 (PI. Ex. No. 6). This deed transferred the 
land and all appurtenances one month after proof of appropriation 
was filed by Appellant's father but approximately 20 months before 
the State Engineer issued the certificate of appropriation. Said 
deed did not reserve the water and included all appurtenances. The 
deed was from Appellant's father to his five children, including 
Appellant, in undivided interests. 
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4. The Trial Court found that the subject water rightf as a 
matter of law, could not have passed as an appurtenance to the 
transfer of land on January 16, 1968 because the State Engineer's 
certificate of appropriation had not issued on the water right. The 
Trial Court thus allowed extrinsic evidence to interpret the terms 
of what are otherwise two ambiguous quit claim deeds by which the 
Appellee claims it received the subject water. The Trial Court then 
found that these two quit claim deeds transferred the water right to 
Lorna and Clara (two of Appellant's sisters) on November 17, 1969. 
(See FF 15 and attached Opinion p. 5.) These deeds constitute 
Appellee's root title. 
5. On October 21, 1969, the State Engineer issued a 
certificate of appropriation on the subject water right. Because of 
a description error the certificate was amended November 25, 1969. 
6. On December 30 and 31, 1969
 f the five children, including 
Lorna, Clara and Appellant/ who owned the land upon which the water 
was being placed to use, joined with each other as grantors and 
conveyed the land to themselves individually. For example, all five 
children joined in conveying 30.1 acres to Appellant Larry Little 
(PI. Ex. D-4) and 41.3 acres to Lorna and Clara (PI. Ex. D-5). None 
of the deeds reserved water and it is stipulated that water was 
actually being placed to use on the acreage so conveyed (Tr. 42; 
Order Amending FF 1) . 
7. At trial, the second conveyance in Appellee's chain of 
title was an assignment dated September 1, 1972 (PTO IV(2) ; Tr. 
192) . 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
JUSTICE DEMANDS THAT A COURT OF LAW ADDRESS AND RESOLVE 
THE CENTRAL AND DISPOSITIVE ISSUES OF THE CASE BEFORE 
ADDRESSING AND RESOLVING QUESTIONS OF FIRST IMPRESSION 
WHICH HAVE NO REAL BEARING ON THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE 
Justice requires that a court of law apply established 
principles of law to the facts of the case. But, that cannot 
possibly occur where, as here, both the Trial Court and the Court 
of Appeals unquestionably sidestep and thus avoid addressing the 
central and dispositive issue of this case. 
It is well established Utah law that a deed in statutory form 
conveys whatever right the grantor has to the water appurtenant to 
the land, unless the water is expressly reserved. Cortella v. Salt 
Lake City, 93 Utah 236, 72 P.2d 630 (Utah 1937); Anderson v. Hamson, 
5 Utah 151, 167 P.2d 254 (Utah 1917). The applicable statute, 
§73-1-11 U.C.A. 1953 could not be more clear. It provides, "A right 
to the use of water appurtenant to land shall pass to the grantee of 
such land" unless expressly reserved. 
Here, both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals decided 
that water, as a matter of law, could not pass as an appurtenance to 
land until the State Engineer issues a certificate of appropriation 
on the subject water right. (See attached Opinion pp. 4 and 5). Be 
that as it may, both Courts then refused to address Appellant's 
undisputed contention that he nevertheless received a deed 
transferring the land and appurtenant water after the State Engineer 
certificate issued (PI. Ex. D-4) - thus rendering the Court's 
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decision on when water becomes appurtenant irrelevant to the 
determination of the case. The conveyance Appellant relies on 
occurred December 30, 1969 and, as a matter of law, had to have 
included appurtenant water because the State Engineer certificate 
issued on the subject water right October 21, 1969 and reissued 
November 25
 f 1969; it was stipulated that the water was actually 
placed to use on the 30.1 acres conveyed to Appellant immediately 
preceding the conveyance of land (Tr. 42; Order Amending FF 1); the 
warranty deed included all appurtenances and did not reserve the 
water (PI. Ex. D-4) ; and the grantors and grantees to the transfer 
of land upon which the water was placed to use testified that that 
was how they passed and received their interest in the subject water 
right (Tr. John Little 97, 100; Lorna Little Cottam Tr. 127
 f 136; 
and Larry Lester Little Tr. 161) . (The grantors and grantees were 
the samef they simply conveyed the land and all appurtenances which 
they held in undivided interests to themselves individually.) Thus, 
it is simply wrong for both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals 
to avoid and fail to address the legal effect of this conveyance. 
There is simply no testimony or evidence presented that even 
suggests that the December 30, 1969 conveyance was not meant to 
include appurtenant water* It is all the more improper for both 
courts to sidestep this conveyance because this issue was 
specifically raised in every proceeding before both lower courts, 
including it being the sole focus of Appellant's Petition for 
Reconsideration to the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the December 30, 
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1969 conveyance rendered unnecessary the decisions of both Courts on 
when water becomes appurtenant to the land because under the Court 
of Appeals1 reasoning Appellant nevertheless received a deed of 
conveyance after the water unquestionably became appurtenant to the 
land. 
There is no dispute in the facts. On January 16 , 1968, the 
land upon which the water was being placed to use was conveyed in 
undivided interests to the children of the grantors. At that time 
no certificate of appropriation had issued. On November 19f 1969, 
the Trial Court determined that the subject water right passed to 
Lorna and Clara, two of the children who by virtue of the January 
16f 1968 conveyance also held the land in undivided interests. The 
State Engineer issued his certificate of appropriation on October 
21, 1969 and because of a descriptive error amended and reissued it 
November 25, 1969. Thus, on November 25, 1969, Lorna and Clara' 
unquestionably owned the land and the water right - under anyone's 
theory. All parties have stipulated that the subject water right 
was actually placed to use on the land Lorna and Clara co-owned 
during the 1969 irrigation season (Tr. 42; Order Amending Findings 
of Fact 1) . Thusr under the rationale adopted by the Court of 
Appeals, the water could have, as of November 19, 1969 or certainly 
no later than November 25
 r 1969 when the certificate of 
appropriation reissuedr passed as an appurtenance to the land. 
Thusr when Lorna and Clara thereafter joined their two brothers and 
one sister in conveying and dividing the land between themselves 
without reserving the water the subject water right passed as an 
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appurtenance to the transfer of land under statutory authority of 
§73-1-11 U.C.A. 1953. By separate warranty deeds dated December 30, 
1969 they conveyed 8 acres to one brother (PI. Ex. D-3) and 30 acres 
to Appellant Larry Little (PI. Ex. D-4) . On December 31f 1969, they 
conveyed 41.3 acres to themselves (PI. Ex. D-5). All deeds included 
all appurtenances. None reserved the water. Criticallyf the only 
testimony of Lorna and Clara was to the effect that this conveyance 
- the December 31
 f 1969 conveyance - was how they thought they 
received their water (Tr. 127f 136) - not by virtue of the November 
19, 1969 quit claim deeds as asserted by Appellee and as found by 
the Trial Court. These conveyances are undisputed and a matter of 
record. No contention has ever been made that these deeds were 
ambiguous. And, they clearly conveyed the land upon which the water 
was being used and to which it was then unquestionably appurtenant. 
Thus, the water passed to the grantees of these deeds as a matter of 
law and under statutory authority of 73-1-11 U.C.A. 1953. There is 
no evidence to the contrary. And, it places the water squarely 
within the chain of title asserted by Appellant and outside the 
chain of title of Appellee. It also demands, as a matter of law, 
reversal of the Trial Court and renders unnecessary the decision 
reached by the Court of Appeals on the issue of whether water is 
appurtenant to land before the State Engineer issues his certificate 
of appropriation. 
Critically/ neither the Trial Court nor the Court of Appeals 
addressed this part of Appellantfs case. Moreover, the Appellees 
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did not address it in their answer brief on appeal or at trial. 
Yet, Appellant has raised it at each stage of these proceedings and 
carefully preserved it for appeal and has set it forth in all briefs 
(see Appellant's Brief pp. 28-30, and Reply Brief pp. 18-20, and 
Petition for Reconsideration) and in argument. 
The issue which the Court of Appeals and the Trial Court 
overlooked can be decided as a matter of law. The subject water, as 
a matter of law, had to have passed as an appurtenance to land 
December 30 and 31, 1969 because there is no evidence to the 
contrary and the deeds of conveyance clearly included all 
appurtenances. Under §73-1-11 U.C.A. 1953 there can be no other 
conclusion. 
II 
THE RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS WILL 
UNDOUBTEDLY DISRUPT AND INVALIDATE THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE 
OF THE UTAH STATE ENGINEER WHICH HAS BEEN UNIFORMLY ACCEPTED 
AND APPLIED FOR OVER 25 YEARS. IN THE PROCESS, IT WILL ALSO 
CLOUD EVERY TITLE THAT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED ACCORDING 
TO THAT POLICY DURING SAID 25 YEAR PERIOD 
Putting aside for the moment the question of why the Trial 
Court and the Court of Appeals elected to tackle a question of first 
impression rather than address the legal effect of the warranty 
deeds dated December 30 and 31, 1969 - which transferred the land 
and appurtenant water after the State Engineer's certificate issued 
- there is the larger problem of the impact their decision will have 
on all conveyances made under said State Engineer policy. The 
instant action provides a good case study. 
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Here, the State Engineer considered the deed of January 16, 
1968 as constituting the root title for the subject water right (PI. 
Ex. No. 6). On January 16f 1968 the owner of the water right had 
submitted proof of appropriation, demonstrating actual and 
beneficial use of the water, the drilling of the well, construction 
of the diversion facilities, etc., but the State Engineer had not 
issued his certificate of appropriation. Under these circumstances 
where there is a demonstrated actual and beneficial use of the water 
the State Engineer has consistently transferred title to the water 
before the certificate issues (Tr. 56). Here, the only reason the 
certificate did not issue was because the State Engineer was too 
busy with other non-related pressing problems (Tr. 56) . Thus, the 
actual certificate did not issue until almost two years after the 
proof of appropriation was submitted. But, the State Engineer 
nevertheless transferred title to the water right as an appurtenance 
to the transfer of land before he issued the certificate of 
appropriation. The next deed in the title abstract maintained by 
the Utah State Engineer on the subject water right is the warranty 
deed dated December 31, 1969 whereby the five children, including 
Lorna and Clara conveyed 41.3 acres to themselves and thus received 
the water appurtenant thereto under statutory authority of §73-1-11 
U.C.A. 1953 (PI. Ex. No. 6, Ex. D) . Critically, the quit claim 
deeds relied upon by the Appellees for their root title are nowhere 
found in the State Engineer files maintained for this water right. 
The Utah State Engineer did not consider Appellee's root title 
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documents as constituting any part of the title to the water right. 
Neither were they filed of record with the Kane County Recorder. 
Moreover, the only testimony of the parties to the December 30 and 
31, 1969 conveyances was to the effect that this was how they 
received their water - as an appurtenance to the transfer of land 
(Cottam Tr. 127, 136; John Little Tr. 97, 100; and Larry Little Tr. 
161). Thus, it would be, and is, absolutely impossible to confirm 
title to a water right if parties are, as here, unable to rely on 
the title abstract maintained by the Utah State Engineer; the 
administrative policies adopted by the Utah State Engineer to 
transfer title to water; the deeds maintained by the County 
Recorder's Office as required by (§73-1-10 U.C.A. 1953); or the 
testimony of the parties to the transaction which is subsequently 
called into question. Here, it is clear that the State Engineer's 
title abstract supports Appellant's and not Appellee's chain of 
title - the two chains of title are mutually exclusive at this point 
and the deeds of January 16
 f 1968 and December 30 and 31, 1969 are 
in Appellant's and not in Appellee's chain of title. Thus, there is 
absolutely no way that a result such as that reached by the Trial 
Court and Court of Appeals will not make title abstracting an 
impossible proposition. 
Ill 
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE DECISION 
OF THE TRIAL COURT 
In order to succeed in an action to quiet title to a water 
right, a party must prevail on the strength of his/her claim. 
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Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch, Inc., 659 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1983). 
Therefore, it is incumbent upon Defendant/Appellees to clearly 
articulate their chain of title - which they could not and did not 
do in the courts below* When they tried to set forth their chain of 
title (Defendant's Brief, pages 25 through 27) critical dates were 
omitted, intervening conveyances were not referenced, and fractional 
ownership interests were not disclosed. Defendants simply did not 
want to set forth their position. Moreover, they clearly changed 
their position from the Trial Court to the Court of Appeals. For 
example, at trial Defendant's chain of title was short and simple. 
Defendant's root title was comprised of two quit claim deeds, one 
was undated and the other bore the date of November 17, 1969. By 
virtue of these two deeds - neither of which expressly referenced 
the subject water right - Defendant's claimed their immediate 
predecessors in interest, Lorna and Clara Bess, obtained 100% of the 
subject water right from their father Lester F. Little. Thereafter, 
Appellee Greene & Weed contended it received its title from Lorna 
and Clara Bess when by assignment dated September 1, 1972 the two 
sisters conveyed 100% of the water right to them (PTO IV(2); Tr. 
192). Contrary to Defendant's theory of title the Trial Court 
expressly found that Greene & Weed obtained their title by virtue of 
deeds - not assignment - from Lorna and Clara Bess and by quit claim 
deed from East Canyon Irrigation Company (FF 20) . Apparently, the 
trial judge was relying on the deeds dated December 18, 1975 whereby 
Lorna and Clara Bess, by separate deeds, expressly conveyed a 5/8ths 
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interest in the disputed water right (Def. Ex. 15 and 15A) and on a 
quit claim deed dated December 18, 1974 from East Canyon Irrigation 
Company (PI. Ex. 14; Def. Ex. D-7) . This finding is absolutely 
inconsistent with Defendant's theory of title. Thus, Defendants 
clearly had to, and didf change their theory of title to accommodate 
the Court's finding - yet their theory still cannot be explained 
because the 5/8ths interest Lorna and Clara Bess expressly conveyed 
is consistent with what Lorna and Clara Bess received by deed dated 
December 31, 1969. So too is the interest of East Canyon Irrigation 
Company which traces its interest back to the December 30, 1969 
conveyance (Tr. 97f 100). Both fall squarely within Appellant's and 
not Appellee's chain of title. 
Significantly, when Defendant did set forth their modified 
chain of title on appeal they did not include all the conveyances 
made by the parties, the ownership interests being conveyed 
(fractional or whole) or, in some circumstances the dates of 
conveyance. They did not do this because it would make their theory 
of title incomprehensible. The inconsistency with the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and that of Defendant's 
theory of title are many. There is simply no theory of title which 
will support Defendant's chain of title. However, Appellant's chain 
of title is clear and consistent and in accordance with the 
testimony of the parties. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals decided a question of 
first impression rather than the central and dispositive issue in 
this case. Water passed as an appurtenance to the conveyance of 
land under statutory authority of §73-1-11 U.C.A. 1953 on December 
30 and 31r 1969, and the uncontradicted testimony of the parties to 
those conveyances was that this was how they received their water 
right. 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that 
this Court grants its Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
Respectfully submitted this ,2-Q^-day of September 1990. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
\ \^ ( L ^ 
John W. Anderson 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals to the following attorneys of record, this g*y ~ day of 
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ADDENDUM A 
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Case No. 890177-CA 
Sixth District, Kane County 
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
Attorneys: John W. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Larry Little 
E. J. Skeen, Salt Lake City, for Appellees Leon S. 
Lippincott and Caroline Lippincott 
Keith S. Christensen, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Greene & Weed Investments 
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Garff. 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Appellant appeals the trial court's decision awarding water 
rights to the appellees.1 We affirm. 
On January 16, 1968, Lester F. Little and Madge Little, 
husband and wife, conveyed to their five children by warranty 
deed 80.1 acres of land located in the Johnson Canyon area in 
1. This is an appeal from an interlocutory decree which the 
lower court certified as a final judgment pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 54(b). The lower court action was brought on two 
counts: (1) a challenge to the state engineer's decision; and 
(2) an action to quiet title to a water right. The issues below 
were bifurcated. The quiet title action was tried first since 
determination of the water right ownership will likely determine 
the challenge to the state engineer's decision. The present 
appeal concerns only the quiet title action. 
Kanab, Utah. The deed conveyed to each an undivided one-fifth 
interest "[t]ogether with all improvements and appurtenances 
appertaining thereto." At the time of the conveyance the water 
right later associated with the land had not yet been 
certificated by the state engineer. This water right was carved 
out of a larger water right application originally filed by 
Lester on April 12, 1955 and approved by the state engineer on 
October 15, 1958. On November 30, 1967, Lester filed the 
application to segregate the water right in question. The new 
application requested permission to appropriate .92 cubic feet 
per second (cfs) out of the 10 cfs in the original application 
for use on 83.3 acres. The state engineer opened a new file upon 
receiving the segregated application. 
Lester constructed diversion facilities and irrigated the 
83.3 acres beginning in the early part of 1967. On December 19, 
1967, Lester filed proof of appropriation with the state engineer 
demonstrating that the diversion facilities were complete and 
that the water had been placed to beneficial use. Approximately 
one month after filing the proof of appropriation, but prior to 
certification, Lester conveyed 80.1 of the 83.3 acres to his five 
children. 
The five children made several conveyances further dividing 
the land. Appellant contends that the initial warranty deed from 
Lester and Madge to the five children transferred the water right 
as an appurtenance to the land. Therefore, the subsequent 
warranty deeds issued by the children also passed the water 
rights, and the quitclaim deeds and other documents relied upon 
by appellees are irrelevant to the court's determination of title 
to the water. 
Appellees argue that the water rights were not conveyed in 
the warranty deeds issued by Lester and Madge. Rather, they 
argue that on November 17, 1969, Lester conveyed the entire water 
right to Lorna and Clara, two of the five children, by quitclaim 
deeds. They argue that water rights cannot be appurtenant to 
land until after the state engineer issues a certificate of 
appropriation. The trial court agreed and held that "[t]he water 
right involved . . . did not pass as an appurtenance to land 
conveyed before it was perfected by the issuance of a certificate 
of appropriation by the State Engineer." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Our review of the trial court's ruling is a question of law 
which we review for correctness. Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135, 
1136 (Utah 1988); see Gonzales v. Morris, 610 P.2d 1285, 1286 
(Utah 1980) ("[Q]uestions of legislative intent and statutory 
application are matters of law, not of fact.") 
Appellant argues here that the water right becomes 
appurtenant upon the filing of the proof of appropriation.2 He 
therefore contends that the water right automatically transferred 
in the warranty deed. He relies specifically on Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-1-11 (1989) which states that "[a] right to the use of 
water appurtenant to land shall pass to the grantee of such 
land" unless expressly reserved by the grantor. He also relies 
on Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-10 (1989), which states that final water 
rights may be transferred by deed in substantially the same 
manner as real estate, and upon Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-18 (1989), 
which states that rights claimed under water right applications 
may be transferred by instruments in writing prior to issuance of 
a certificate of appropriation. 
To determine if the water right here was appurtenant to the 
land at the time of the initial conveyance, we must look to the 
nature of the right created by statute. See Bonham v. Morgan, 
788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989), reh'g denied (1990); Mosbv 
Irrigation Co. v. Criddle, 11 Utah 2d 41, 46, 354 P.2d 848, 852 
(1960). In determining the nature of this right we rely upon the 
plain language of the statutes in question and prior case law. 
Bonham, 788 P.2d at 500. In this analysis, we note that the 
right to use and appropriate water is created by statute. See 
Criddle, 11 Utah 2d at 46, 354 P.2d at 852; Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 73-3-1 to -29 (1989). The statutory procedure "prescribes the 
exclusive manner in which such a right can be initiated, the 
conditions upon which such right can be acquired, and the 
procedural requirements which must be complied with." Criddle, 
11 Utah 2d at 46, 354 P.2d at 852. 
Section 73-1-11 provides that "water appurtenant to land 
shall pass to the grantee of such land . . . ." The term 
••appurtenant" is not defined by statute. The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated, however, that "[a] water right, acguired bv 
appropriation and used for a beneficial and necessary purpose in 
connection with a given tract of land, is an appurtenance 
thereto, and as such passes with the conveyance of the land, 
unless expressly reserved from the grant." Thompson v. McKinney, 
91 Utah 89, 98, 63 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1937) (emphasis added) 
2. A proof of appropriation is the next to last step in the 
statutory water appropriation process. Before a certificate of 
appropriation is issued the applicant must first file the proof 
of appropriation demonstrating that diversion facilities are 
complete and that a stated quantity of water has been applied to 
a beneficial use. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-16 (1989). 
(quoting Lensina v. Day & Hansen Sec, Co,, 67 Mont. 382, 215 P. 
999, 1000 (1923)). 
Two steps must be completed before water becomes appurtenant 
to land. First, the water must be beneficially applied to a 
specific tract of land. Thompson, 91 Utah at 97-98, 63 P.2d at 
1061. Second, all the statutory steps for appropriation must be 
completed. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1 (1989) (no water rights 
may be appropriated without first following statutory 
requirements); Criddle, 11 Utah 2d at 46, 354 P.2d at 852; 
Thompson, 91 Utah at 98, 63 P.2d at 1061 (appropriation plus 
beneficial use equals appurtenant right); see also Eardley v. 
Terrv, 94 Utah 367, 375, 77 P.2d 362, 365 (1938). The first step 
is completed when the proof of appropriation is filed. The 
second step, however, can only be satisfied when the entire 
statutory process is complete. Prior to completion of the entire 
appropriation process, the applicant only has an inchoate3 
right to the use of the water. See Criddle, 11 Utah 2d at 46, 
354 P.2d at 852. 
When Lester transferred the 80.1 acres to his five children 
on January 16, 1968, the final statutory requirement in the 
appropriative process, the issuance of a certificate, had not 
been accomplished. Even though Lester had previously completed 
the diversion facilities, applied the water to beneficial use, 
and filed the proof of appropriation, the water right could not 
be appurtenant to the land. The appropriation process is 
complete only after the certificate of appropriation is issued 
and that certificate then becomes "prima facie evidence" of the 
owner's water right. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17 (1989);4 
3. The term "inchoate" means "[i]mperfect; partial; unfinished; 
begun, but not completed . . . ." Black's Law Dictionary 686 
(5th ed. 1979). 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17 (1989) provides, in pertinent part, 
as follows: 
Upon it being made to appear to the 
satisfaction of the state engineer that an 
appropriation . . . has been perfected in 
accordance with the application therefor, 
and that the water appropriated . . . has 
been put to a beneficial use, as required 
by Section 73-3-16, he shall issue a 
certificate . . . . The certificate so 
issued and filed shall be prima facie 
evidence of the owner's right to the use 
of the water in the quantity, for the 
purpose, at the place, and during the time 
specified therein, subject to prior rights. 
Eardley, 94 Utah at 375, 77 P.2d at 365 (M[N]o final rights are 
acquired until the proof . . . is made and a certificate has been 
issued by the state engineer."); Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake 
View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76, 81, 166 P. 309, 311 (1917) 
(certificate is appropriator•s deed of title good against the 
state and against everyone else who cannot show a superior 
right). 
We therefore conclude that the January 16, 1968 warranty 
deed did not transfer the water as an appurtenance to the land. 
The trial court properly found that the November 19, 1969 
quitclaim deed did transfer the water right at a time when that 
right was fully vested.5 
X Ttyb decision of the trial court is affirmed. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
&t) p(Sy 
ench, ijudge 
fJ&?j£*Gi *£sp ^^, 
ss,0 / / 
SggnalW. Garff, Judge'// 
/ / 
5. In its findings of fact, the trial court concluded that 
Lester and Madge intended to transfer the entire water right in 
the November 17, 1969 quitclaim deed, even though that deed 
contained an incorrect property description. The trial court's 
decision was based in part on a subsequent undated quitclaim 
deed and on other documents which revealed the grantors* 
intent. We find no error in the trial court's ruling. 
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Larry Little, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Greene & Weed Investments, Leon 
S. Lippincott, Caroline 
Lippincott, and Dee C. Hansen, 
State Engineer of the State of 
Utah, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 890177-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed August 29, 
1990, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 5th day of September, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT 
Mary \y. Noonan, Clerk 
